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I. Standard Approach to Political Legitimacy: 
 Justification  Legitimacy  Obligation 
 Justification: providing moral or prudential reasons to take the state or 
government or authority as legitimate; 
 Legitimacy: right to rule, that is right to impose duties on subjects and to enforce 
them; 
 Political obligation: duty or obligation to obey the authority’s directives. 
 
II. Simmons’s criticism: 
 Justification X Legitimacy  Obligation 
 Justification simpliciter: ‘the impersonal presentation of objectively good reasons 
or good arguments to a conclusion’, that is meant to show how a certain kind of 
state may be morally acceptable, prudentially rational or both; 
 Legitimacy: ‘complex moral right to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties to its 
subjects, and to use coercion to enforce these duties’, which requires a form of 
personal legitimation by individual actual consent in order to exist. 
 
III. Rawls’s ‘internalist’ way-out: 
 Justification (to the reasonable)  Legitimacy  Obligation 
 Justification: addressed to specific people (the reasonable) and meant to provide 
them with reasons they could reasonably be expected to accept; 
 Legitimacy: moral right of the state, which results from the fact that reasonable 
people can be expected to endorse such state.  
 
IV. Christiano’s ‘externalist’ way-out: 
 Justification  Legitimacy  Obligation 
 Justification: set of reasons to take a state as minimally just, according to the 
fundamental principle of justice (equal advancement of the interests of all); 
 Legitimacy: since we have a natural duty of justice that prescribes us to support 
just institutions, we have an obligation to obey any state which is minimally just; 
 The fact that a state is minimally just makes it legitimate because we have an 
obligation to obey just institutions derived from the natural duty of justice. 
 
V. Some problems with a natural duty of justice: 
 It does not take disagreement seriously into account; 
 It fails to fulfill two requirements that characterize other natural duties: 
o Perfection; 
o Conditionality; 
 It produces unexpectedly bad consequences for democracy.  
 
 
 If our obligation to obey democratic decisions depends on a natural duty of 
justice about whose requirements and implications we disagree, then either we 
end up without a proper obligation democracy is legitimate only insofar as it 
respects the principle of public equality,  
